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Introduction
The historic end of the Cold War and the rising tide of globalization have significantly 
changed the nature of threats and security discourses in Asia. There is a notable 
shift of attention from military power as the core determinant of national security 
to several non-traditional sectors with a much enhanced role of economic, political, 
and societal forces. Non-traditional security issues—such as climate change, natural 
disasters, transnational crimes, and terrorism—require both policymakers and 
military strategists to deal with security threats in a more comprehensive manner. 
Increasing interdependence among states also magnifies the impacts of these threats, 
urging Asian countries to forge regional cooperation in multilateral forums such 
as ASEAN, EAS, APEC, and ARF. Though these efforts are commendable, their 
effectiveness in tackling such a wide canvass of threats is still open to question.2 
What is more worrying to Asia is the resurgence of border disputes and nationalism. 
Territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea have “doubled” the risks 
for several Asian countries, including Vietnam. Having been troubled by the global 
economic meltdown and the creeping effects of climate change, Vietnam must 
confront the rising challenges of conflicting claims in the South China Sea and water 
security in the Mekong region. This paper aims to analyze how Vietnamese official 
perceptions of national security challenges have changed over the last few years, 
identify the three most daunting security challenges to Vietnam in the year 2012, and 
study its implications for the defense sector and the future of regional cooperation. 
1 Tran Truong Thuy (PhD) and Nguyen Minh Ngoc are Research Fellows at the Institute for East Sea Studies, 
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the institution with which they are affiliated.
2 Eddie Walsh, “Non-traditional security threats in Asia: Finding a regional way forward,” East Asia Forum, June 
4, 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/04/non-traditional-security-threats-in-asia-finding-a-regional-
way-forward/ (accessed January 10, 2013).
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Official Perceptions of Vietnam’s National Security Challenges 
Although official perceptions of the most challenging security threats and the 
priorities attached to them were largely shaped by the external environment and 
internal situation, there are four major security challenges that Vietnam has confronted 
since the end of Cold War. They are: economic weakness, regime security, territorial 
sovereignty, and non-traditional security issues. 
The Defense White Paper in 2004 and especially the Defense White Paper 2009 
highlighted “diversified and complicated security challenges” Vietnam is facing as 
follows: (i) Economy has been in danger of further lagging behind due to insufficient 
resilience while coping with the serious impact of the global financial crisis and 
economic recession, (ii) Democratic freedom, religious freedom, and human 
rights have been abused by hostile forces in order to undermine the great national 
solidarity, and to incite violence and separatism in some areas of the country, (iii) 
Disputes over sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the East Sea3 have 
“seriously affected many activities and the maritime economic development of 
Vietnam,” (iv) Non-traditional security issues such as illegal trafficking of weapons 
and drugs, piracy, organized transnational crimes, terrorism, illegal migration and 
immigration, environmental degradation, climate change, and epidemics continue 
to concern Vietnam.4 
Resolution of the 11th National Party Congress adopted in January 2011 also stated 
that “The Asia-Pacific, including Southeast Asia, will . . . contain many factors 
possibly leading to instabilities. More territorial, sea and island disputes will occur.” 
For Vietnam, the Resolution identified “major and intertwined challenges” that 
Vietnam will face in the next five years, namely economic weakness and regime 
security. Regarding economic weakness, the Resolution stated that Vietnam is at 
“risk of lagging behind in economic development with other countries.” For regime 
security, there are both internal and external challenges. Internally, “the degradation 
in political ideology, thought, morality and lifestyle of a number of cadres and Party 
3 The South China Sea is translated in Vietnamese as East Sea (or Biển Đông). For the purpose of academic 
discussion, the author will use “the South China Sea” in this article.
4 Defence White Paper 2004
http://admm.org.vn/sites/eng/Pages/vietnam-snationaldefenseintheearly-nd-14441.html?cid=236.
Defence White Paper 2009, pp 17-18. http://admm.org.vn/sites/eng/Pages/vietnamnationaldefence%28vietnam
whitepapers-nd-14440.html?cid=236.
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members who are involved in bureaucracy, corruption and waste will still be serious, 
lowering the people’s confidence in the Party and State.” Externally, “hostile forces 
will continue implementing the ‘peaceful evolution’ scheme, causing disturbances 
and using the so-called ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ in order to change the 
political system in Vietnam.”5 
The Political Report adopted at the 11th Party Congress in 2011 defined major 
defense and security objectives, and tasks relating to three of the four aforementioned 
challenges. They are: (i) protecting national independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, (ii) protecting the Party, State, people, and the regime, ensuring political 
stability, social order and security, as well as actively preventing and defeating any 
hostile attempts and activities to damage the state, and (iii) readily responding to 
global non-traditional security challenges.6 
Among non-traditional security threats, the issue of water resources has become 
increasingly important for Vietnam in recent years. Construction of dams by China 
and Laos on the mainstream of the Mekong River will have a major impact on the 
Mekong Delta of Vietnam. On September 29, 2012, Vietnam’s President Truong 
Tan Sang delivered a speech at the meeting with business leaders on the sidelines 
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Russia, warning that 
tensions over water resources are not only threatening economic growth, but also 
presenting a new source of conflict. He believed that the management and utilization 
of water resources in the Mekong River are developing into a “pressing issue with 
direct and unfavorable bearing” on Vietnam, especially on rice production.7 Water 
resources in the Mekong River are transnational in nature—therefore Vietnam needs 
to engage in international cooperation to ensure water security.
5 “Resolution of the 11th National Party Congress,” http://www.nhandan.com.vn/cmlink/nhandan-online/
homepage/politics/11th-party-congress/coverage-on-the-party-congress/resolution-of-the-11th-party-national-
congress-1.282810.
6 “Political Report of the 11th National Party Congress.”
7 Address by President of Viet Nam Truong Tan Sang at the plenary session on "Water: A New Global Strategic 
Resource” at APEC 20, 2012,
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns120908003447.
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Vietnam’s Daunting Security Challenges: A Critical Examination
Given the breadth of challenges that Vietnam has to cope with, it is essential to 
identify the groups of threats that pose the gravest danger to national security and 
development. For the purpose of this paper, the author will concentrate on three 
issues that are most likely to stay on top of the agenda of Vietnamese policymakers 
and strategists, namely: (i) protecting sovereignty and maritime interests in the 
South China Sea, (ii) sustaining uninterrupted economic growth, (iii) tackling non-
traditional security threats, the most salient of which is the complex nexus of climate 
change and food/water security.
Protecting Sovereignty and Maritime Interests in the South China Sea  
The South China Sea issue continue to be the number one security challenge for 
Vietnam. In Hanoi’s view, the South China Sea relates to almost all aspects of 
national security and development: protecting territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty, promoting maritime economic development, maintaining external 
peaceful environment, especially peaceful relationships with China and other 
claimants, and safeguarding the regime’s legitimacy and internal stability.   
There are at least four issues that Vietnam has to tackle in the South China Sea 
disputes: (i) sovereignty claims over “land features” in the Spratlys, (ii) sovereignty 
claims over “land features” in the Paracels, (iii) sovereignty rights and jurisdiction 
within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf including 
management and utilization of hydrocarbon, mineral resources, and other living 
resources, especially fishing, (iv) and China’s arrest of Vietnamese fishermen and 
the confiscation of their vessels in the Paracels. 
Although Vietnam has overlapping claims in the South China Sea with five other 
parties (China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines), ASEAN claimants 
have implicitly reached a common understanding in maintaining the status-quo of 
occupation, settling disputes by peaceful means, and refraining from activities that 
can negatively affect interests of other members. Taiwan’s activities have mainly 
concentrated on its occupied-island Itu-Aba, the largest feature of Spratlys, and 
therefore did not directly threaten Vietnam’s security in the South China Sea. 
China’s excessive claims and growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, on the 
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other hand, have stirred regional wariness and made it harder for Vietnam to protect 
its legitimate interests.
China claims sovereignty over all islands, rocks, and reefs in the Paracel and Spratly 
archipelagoes, and published the U-shaped line (or nine-dotted line) map claiming 
about 80% of the waters in the South China Sea on the basis of historical rights, 
exclusive economic zones, and the continental shelf of the Paracels and the Spratlys. 
China has occupied the whole Paracels since 1974 and seven features of the Spratlys 
since 1988. In 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration of Conduct of parties 
in the South China Sea, and committed to “resolving disputes by peaceful means . . 
. without resorting to the threat or use of force.”8 
Although China is not satisfied with the status-quo of occupation in the Spratlys, it did 
not attempt to attack (and possibly will not attack in the near future) the Vietnamese-
controlled islands and rocks there. Increasingly for Vietnam, the issue of defending 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction on exclusive economic zones and the continental 
shelf has become more prominent than the issues of sovereignty claim over “land 
features” of the Paracels and the Spratlys. China’s renewed assertiveness in the South 
China Sea since 2009 has raised the occurrence of incidents in the overlapping area 
between the U-shaped line and Vietnam’s EEZ. The issue of resources exploitation 
(hydrocarbon and fish) on Vietnam’s EEZ becomes the most frequent source of 
tensions between Vietnam and China. On the one hand, China accused Vietnam 
and other claimants of extracting “China’s oil,” and catching “China’s fish,” while 
China has not obtained any drop of oil from the Spratlys, and Chinese fisherman 
are being captured and driven away.9 On the other hand, China tried to prevent 
Vietnam from oil and gas development in the overlapping area between China’s 
U-shaped line and Vietnam’s EEZ. China threatened a number of foreign oil and 
gas companies to stop joint offshore exploration operations with Vietnam, or face 
8 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-
on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea.
9 Mingjiang Li, “Reconciling Assertiveness and Cooperation? China’s Changing Approach to the South China 
Sea Dispute,” Security Challenges, Volume 6, Number 2 (Winter 2010), p 51, p 58.
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unfathomable consequences in their businesses with China.10 Within 2011-2012, at 
least three times China adopted more aggressive tactics of using law enforcement 
vessels (from Maritime Surveillance Agency) and/or fishing boats to harass and cut 
the seismic cables of commercial oil exploration vessels operating within Vietnam’s 
EEZ.11 China has unilaterally imposed fishing bans between May and August every 
year since 1999. Chinese maritime law enforcement forces have repeatedly detained 
Vietnamese fishermen, confiscated fishing boats, and charged fines for their release. 
In 2012, Vietnam had to deal with a more coordinated and centralized China in its 
approach toward the South China Sea issues than in previous years. In response to the 
adoption of Vietnam’s Law of the Sea in June 2012, China at the same time employed 
multi-directional measures such as issuing diplomatic protests, establishing the 
prefecture-level city of Sansha to administer the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, and 
Spratly Islands and “their surrounding waters” in the South China Sea,12 offered 
oil blocks within Vietnam’s EEZ for international bidding,13 deployed a large 
number of paramilitary vessels to patrol the South China Sea, and put the military 
forces of “Sansha city” under the combat-ready position.14 Other evidences of a 
10 Scot Marciel, “Maritime Issues and Sovereignty Disputes in East Asia,” Testimony before the Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, July 15, 2009, 
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/20090715_2/.
For summary of leaked US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks on China's protests against international oil 
firms signing exploration deals with Vietnam in the South China Sea, see Greg Torode, “Beijing pressure intense in 
South China Sea row,” South China Morning Post, September 23, 2011, http://topics.scmp.com/news/china-news-
watch/article/Beijing-pressure-intense-in-South-China-Sea-row.
11 First cable cutting incident on May 26, 2011, took place in an area just about 80 miles off the south-central 
coast of Vietnam, within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone when three Chinese patrol ships accosted and 
harassed the Vietnamese ship Binh Minh 02. See “Press conference on Chinese maritime surveillance vessel's 
cutting exploration cable of PetroViet Nam Seismic Vessel,” http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/
ns110530220030#1JLxTTgwqAy2.
Second incident occurred on June 9, 2011, when a Chinese fishing boat, with support from Chinese fishing 
patrol vessels, rammed the survey cables of the PetroVietnam ship Viking II, which was conducting a seismic 
survey in Block 136-03, an area within 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone of Vietnam. Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga at the Press Conference, June 9, 2011, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/
pbnfn/ns110610100618#kyKoH1NekSr9.
Most recent incident happened on December 3, 2012 when two Chinese boats ran up behind and cut seismic survey 
cables of PetroVietnam’s ship Binh Minh 02 while this commercial ship was operating in the area outside the 
mouth of Tonkin Gulf on Vietnam’s side, about 20 miles from median line between China’s coast and Vietnam’s 
coast. See “PetroVietnam Protests Chinese Ships’ Breakage of Survey Cable,” http://biengioilanhtho.gov.vn/eng/
PrintNews.aspx?NewsId=4466f14c.
12 “Administrative status of islands raised,”  
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-06/21/content_15517602.htm.
13 CNOOC, “Notification of Part of Open Blocks in Waters under Jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China 
Available for Foreign Cooperation in the Year of 2012,” http://en.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/news/2012-06-22/
english/322127.html.
14 “China pledges to protect maritime sovereignty,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-06/29/
content_15533944.htm.
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more coordinated and centralized approach can be seen in China’s handling of the 
Scarborough confrontation with the Philippines in April 2012.15 
China also initiated several steps that are regarded as infringements on Vietnam’s 
sovereignty and rights in the South China Sea, which provoked protests from Hanoi. 
The Chinese government issued new electronic passports with the map of the 
U-shaped line claiming most of the South China Sea. In November 2012, the Hainan 
provincial government announced new regulations allowing law enforcement 
vessels to board, inspect, detain, expel, or confiscate foreign ships conducting 
“illegal” activities within Chinese waters. Though Hainan’s officials and China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson assured the international community that 
the scope of application of this rule is within 12 nautical miles of Hainan’s coast 
and the Paracels,16 the language of the regulation regarding Chinese “jurisdictional 
waters” and “Sansha city” is relatively ambiguous, which can be later exploited 
by Chinese law enforcement agencies to expand “board and search” activities to 
the U-shaped line, or at least to the territorial sea of other islands and rocks in the 
South China Sea.17 Tension is likely to increase if China applies this new regulation 
and arrests Vietnamese fishermen conducting fishing activities near the Paracels. In 
case Chinese law enforcement agencies expand “board and search” activities to the 
territorial sea of Vietnamese-controlled islands and rocks in the Spratlys, there will 
be new clashes and incidents in these areas.
In response to China’s increasing encroachments in the South China Sea, Vietnam 
applies the policy of a weaker party in asymmetric relations to defend its national 
interests while seeking to preserve an external peaceful environment. This policy is 
relatively comprehensive and combines several directions: (i) using international law, 
especially the UNCLOS 1982, to defend its maritime claims, (ii) negotiating directly 
15 To deter the Philippines, China applied a comprehensive and coordinated approach, from imposing diplomatic 
pressures, strengthening presence in the disputed area with hundreds of fishing boats and law enforcement vessels 
from deferent agencies (Marine Surveillance and Fishing Patrol), applying economic sanctions on Philippines 
agricultural products and promoting international propaganda. In relations with ASEAN, to influence on the chair 
– Cambodia – and on ASEAN’s internal discussions, President Hu Jintao visited Cambodia just before opening of 
ASEAN summit in April. Defense Minister Liang Guanglie also paid an official visit to Cambodia during the 6th 
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in May, informally turning the ADMM into ADMM+1.
16 “China says 'board and search' sea rules limited to Hainan coast,”
 http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/12/31/china-seas-idINL4N0A51QH20121231.
17 See text in Chinese at http://www.hq.xinhuanet.com/news/2013-01/01/c_114221654.htm
Vietnamese translation: “Điều lệ quản lý trị an biên phòng ven biển tỉnh Hải Nam,” http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/
tin-ncbd/3275-iu-l-qun-ly-tr-an-bien-phong-ven-bin-tnh-hi-nam.
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with China to defuse tensions and settle remaining bilateral issues, particularly the 
delimitation of maritime areas outside the mouth of Tonkin Gulf, (iii) working with 
other members of ASEAN in engaging China in DOC implementation and working 
towards a new code of conduct (COC), (iv) bringing up the South China Sea issues 
in regional forums with the participation of other external powers, (v) and improving 
capacity for deterrent purpose, especially modernizing navy and strengthening law 
enforcement capability (Marine Police and Fishing Patrol Agency). 
Map 1: Nine blocks that CNOOC announced for tender of oil and gas exploration 
in June 2012.
Sources: CNOOC, PetroVietnam
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Sustaining Uninterrupted Economic Growth: A New Security Challenge?
Vietnam’s economy has been hard hit by the global financial crisis and it grew at 
the slowest pace in 13 years in 2012. According to the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam (GSO), GDP rose 5.03% this year, down from 5.89% in 2011 and the least 
since 4.77% in 1999. Foreign investment pledges fell 14% this year and Vietnam’s 
credit rating was cut by Moody’s Investors Service due to mounting bad debt and 
weakened state-owned enterprises (SOE).18 
The real-estate market stays stagnant and shows no sign of recovery, while the 
number of insolvent businesses continues to rise. A survey conducted by the Business 
Registration Management Agency, Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment 
revealed that in 2012, 44,906 businesses suspended operation and 9,355 dissolved.19 
Though exports have grown and made up for what was probably sluggish domestic 
demand, economic growth in 2013 is projected to be at the same level as last year, 
or slightly higher.
More importantly, these figures might point to more chronic economic problems 
that recurred in the 2006-2011 period, argued Dr. Vuong Quan Hoang. First, he 
observed that Vietnam “experienced a severe trade deficit from 2006 to 2010, about 
$12.5 billion per year, or roughly 22% of total exports revenue. This is a non-trivial 
increase from the 17.3% ratio of the 2001-2005 period, especially since exports grew 
faster than the economy’s output expansion.”20 Second, the emerging economy of 
Vietnam proved to be inefficient, with wasteful use of physical and capital resources 
through an indicator called the “Investment-to-GDP” ratio.21 This ratio has gone up 
over three critical phases: 34.9% (1996-2000) to 39.1% (2001-2005) 43.5% (2006-
2010), before falling to 34.6% in the crisis year of 2011, meaning that “the country 
18 “Vietnam Grows at Slowest Pace Since ’99 on Credit Slump: Economy,” Bloomberg, 25 December 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-24/vietnam-economy-grows-5-03-this-year-slowest-pace-
since-1999.html (accessed January 10, 2013)
19 “Nam 2012: Gan 55,000 doanh nghiep dung hoat dong va giai the” [2012: Almost 55,000 businesses suspended 
operation and dissolved], Economy and Forecast Review,
http://tapchikinhtedubao.mpi.gov.vn/p0c285n15086/nam-2012-gan-55000-doanh-nghiep-dung-hoat-dong-va-
giai-the.htm (accessed January 10, 2013). 
20 See Vuong Quan Hoang, “Vietnam’s Economic Challenges,” Stratfor, 21 August 2013, http://www.stratfor.
com/other-voices/vietnams-economic-challenges (accessed January 10, 2013).
21 The higher the ratio is, the less efficient the output productivity of the economy becomes.
102 Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and Its Implications for the Defense Sector
had to use more scarce resources to finance and support its growth.”22 Unfortunately, 
Vietnam’s growth rate also dropped over time (6.8% in 2010, 5.89% in 2011 and 
5.03% in 2012).23 Third, most law-makers voiced their concern about privileges 
granted to SOEs in acquiring scarce financial (bank credits, subsidy programs, bad 
debt “restructuring” and even cash injection) and physical assets (land, housing, 
mines, and other monopolistic pecuniary rights in doing businesses), citing total 
officially registered borrowings by SOEs reaching VND 1,300 trillion ($62.2 billion) 
while their total assets were only $87.7 billion. In July, the State Bank of Vietnam 
said that 8.6% of loans in the banking system were bad, and this is considered the 
highest ratio amongst any of the ASEAN states.24 
The worsening economic conditions have presented serious challenges to the 
credibility of the government and the legitimacy of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV). In 1986, under Doi Moi reforms, the CPV decided to promote economic 
development as the most important source of its legitimacy. Lagging behind other 
countries economically is considered the most serious threat because the Party 
believes economic underdevelopment will breed political instability and undermine 
its rule. Moreover, the CPV leadership also judged that economic development 
and improved living conditions would help ward off other threats to the regime, 
especially “peaceful evolution.”
However, since 2005, Vietnam’s inflation rate has been steadily rising. Between 2005 
and 2010, Vietnam’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by 64.32%, and 2007 
saw the highest year-on-year inflation rate at 22.97%. Increased prices have, to some 
degree, offset the benefits of economic growth and considerably worsened living 
standards, especially of poor people. Moreover, the near bankruptcy of the state-
owned ship building giant Vinashin has led to severe criticism of the government 
over the poor management of the economy in general, and state-owned corporations 
22 Another way to assess how wasteful the economy has become is the measure ICOR (incremental capital to 
output ratio). It measure show many more units of capital investment the economy requires to produce one more 
unit of economic output. The answer is dismal. Vietnam’s ICOR was around 5:1 during 1996-2005, but increased 
to around 6:1 from 2006 to 2011. See Vuong, op. cit.
23 Logically, statistics show that productivity per capita in Vietnam is very low compared to other countries in 
East Asia, only $2,072/person (in 2010), while that same measure for Japan is $80,307, South Korea $33,638, 
Thailand $4,854, China $4,087, the Philippines $3,324, and Indonesia $2,859.
24 James Parker, “Vietnam’s Economic Challenge”, The Diplomat, September 13, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/
pacific-money/2012/09/13/vietnams-economic-challenge/ (accessed January 10, 2013).
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in particular. In the last five years, there have been 3,829 mass public protests of 
which 326 involved more than 50 participants.25 Harsh economic conditions are 
usually at the heart of these protests.
Although the CPV’s decision to base its legitimacy on socio-economic performance 
proved rational, it also presents the Party and the government with a new challenge: 
to maintain uninterrupted economic development. This will become a daunting task 
for the ruling regime due to Vietnam’s increasing dependence on external exchanges 
for its economic wellbeing.
The Dangerous Nexus of Non-traditional Security Threats: The Mekong Case Study
Vietnam is one of the several countries most adversely affected by climate change, 
and this has been confirmed in many studies by the World Bank, UNDP, and the UN 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In 2009, an assessment report 
by the Institute of Strategy and Policy on Natural Resources and Environment (within 
Vietnam’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment) revealed that during 
the 1958-2007 period, Vietnam’s annual average surface temperature has increased 
by approximately 0.5–0.7oC, while the sea level along its coastline has risen by 
approximately 20 cm.26 It is estimated that if the sea level rises by 1 meter, 22 million 
Vietnamese people will be homeless.27 Climate change has resulted in more severe 
and/or frequent occurrences of natural disasters, such as cyclonic storms, floods, and 
droughts. From 2001 to 2010, extreme patterns of weather in Vietnam killed 9,500 
people with a total property loss equivalent to 1.5% GDP per year.28 
What seems more alarming is that the catastrophic impact of climate change can 
“spill over” to other sectors such as agricultural production and water resources. It 
is estimated that if the temperature increases by 1oC, the rice yield will decrease 
25 “Khong nen quay lung voi khieu nai dong nguoi” [Mass public protests should not be ignored], Vietnamnet, 
August 23, 2011.
26 “Vietnam Assessment Report on Climate Change,” Institute of Strategy and Policy on Natural Resources and 
Environment, Hanoi, 2009, www.unep.org/pdf/dtie/VTN_ASS_REP_CC.pdf (accessed January 11, 2013).
27 “Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world,” Human Development Report 2007/8 UNDP, 
p. 105, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-8/ (accessed January 11, 2013)
“Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change,” World Bank, 2010, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/
default/files/documents/EACC_Vietnam.pdf (accessed January 11, 2013)
28 Vietnam’s National Strategy on Climate Change, issued by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in Decision 
2139/QĐ-TTg on December 05, 2011, p.6, http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/English/strategies/strat
egiesdetails?categoryId=30&articleId=10051283 (accessed January 11, 2013)
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by 10%.29 Large cultivation areas in the Mekong and Red River Deltas are likely 
to be affected by salt water intrusion due to sea level rise. Climate change is also 
likely to result in increasing extinction of biodiversity and affect people’s health, as 
increasing temperatures facilitate the growth of various viruses and disease carriers. 
Here, the “evil” nexus between climate change, food/water security, and other 
aspects of human security unfolds and the region most vulnerable to these complex 
threats is the Mekong River Delta. 
According to the IPCC, 1 meter of sea level rise in Vietnam would lead to the 
flooding of up to 20,000 km2 of the Mekong River Delta, and more than 1 million 
people in this region would be directly affected.30 1.77 million ha of land will be 
salinized, accounting for 45% of the total land. A sea level rise of 30 centimeters (a 
scenario for 2050) would increase the salinity of the main tributaries of the Mekong 
River as far as 10 kilometers inland. Inundation and the resulting loss of land and 
saline water intrusion in the Mekong Delta and parts of the Red River Delta, the 
country’s most important agricultural areas, will pose serious threats to farmers as 
well as to agricultural exports such as rice (of which Vietnam is the second largest 
exporter in the world), and possibly to national food security.
Added to the existing problems is China’s massive cascade of dams on the Upper 
Mekong in Yunnan province and the dams proposed on the Lower Mekong Basin’s 
mainstream in Laos, Cambodia, and on the Thai-Lao border. Vietnam is greatly 
concerned about these projects, at least for following reasons. First, dams in China 
and in the lower mainstream (with total reservoir storage capacity of about 40 billion 
m3) will trap a big portion of the Mekong’s sediment that the river should naturally 
transport to the Delta. The fertility of the Delta, vital for rice cultivation, will suffer 
and productivity will decline.31 Second, most of the dams in China and all of 12 
dams in mainstream of Lower Mekong basin are “run-of-river dams,” but they are 
designed for daily regulation to meet changing power demand, mainly during the dry 
29 “The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Review,” ADB, 2009, p4-6, http://www.
adb.org/publications/economics-climate-change-southeast-asia-regional-review (accessed January 11, 2013)
30 “Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability,” Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press.
31 Dao Trong Tu, “A Vietnamese Perspective on Proposed Mainstream Mekong Dams,” Stimson, December 8, 
2011, http://www.stimson.org/summaries/a-vietnamese-perspective-on-proposed-mainstream-mekong-dams/ 
(accessed January 11, 2013).
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season. This poses a risk to downstream water levels, especially during the dry 
season and gives way to salinity intrusion in the Mekong Delta. Third, Laos’ recent 
decision to move ahead with the construction of Xayaburi can be followed by the 
development of another 11 dams on the Mekong mainstream. However, the 
cumulative downstream impacts of Xayaburi and the 11 other dams have not yet 
been adequately studied. The real possibility might be distant, but should there be a 
dam failure, whether due to human error or natural factors (disasters) like earthquakes, 
it will leave huge negative impacts on Vietnam, as well as other countries affected by 
dams on the Mekong River. While the complex vested interests of states in this 
region make it harder to coordinate actions, the Mekong River Commission is only 
an advisory body that cannot alone impose or enforce any binding agreements on 
plans to develop the water resources of the Mekong basin.
Source:  Richard Cronin and Timothy Hamlin, “Mekong Turning Point: Shared River for a Shared Future”, 
Stimson Center, January 2012.32
32 See more at http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/new-publication-mekong-turning-point/.
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It can be seen from the above discussion that the Mekong Delta of Vietnam is expected 
to suffer greatly under the “double impacts” of both upstream dam development and 
global climate change. The interfaces of between environment, development, and 
security in the Mekong Delta will pose a direct threat to the country as the region is 
now home to nearly 18 million people, and the source of half of Vietnam’s national 
rice production.
Implications for Vietnam’s Defense Development and 
Modernization
The implications of aforementioned challenges for Vietnam’s defense sector are 
numerous. There are at least two aspects of these implications. First, as a medium 
and centralized country, Vietnam is applying a comprehensive approach in dealing 
with national security challenges, in which defense sector plays an important role. 
Consequently, changes in perceptions and especially in overall policy to deal with 
specific security challenges require coordinated defense strategy, sound restructuring, 
and effective investment in defense sector. Second, Vietnam has to strike a good 
balance between security and development objectives within its government 
expenditure, which mirrors real growth in GDP. In other words, economic conditions 
will most often determine the budget for defense sector. 
The implications for the defense sector can be seen as follows: First, though Vietnam 
is embracing diplomacy as its “first line of defense,” and is using international law 
to resolve the disputes by “peaceful means,” rising competition in the South China 
Sea has induced Hanoi to invest in improving its “deterrent” capacity. After about 
a decade of inadequate investment, Vietnam is modernizing its deterrent capability 
through naval, air, and electronic-fighting capability upgrades. For instance, it was 
widely reported that Vietnam signed contracts with Russia to buy six Project 636 
Kilo-Class submarines with a value of up to US$1.8 billion. Vietnam also ordered 
four Russian Gepard-class light frigates, specially equipped for anti-submarine 
warfare, and in 2011 deployed its first two. In 2012, Vietnam is also finalizing a 
contract to purchase four Sigma-class corvettes from the Netherlands. To provide 
air cover to its naval fleet and skies, Vietnam is acquiring at least 20 Russian-made 
Su-30MK2 multi-role fighter aircrafts in addition to about a dozen relatively modern 
SU-27s and MiG aircrafts. To improve naval surveillance and patrol, Vietnam has 
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procured six amphibious DHC-6 Twin Otter aircrafts from Canada.33 
The second implication is closely related to the first one: Vietnam needs to improve 
interoperability capacity to effectively coordinate its maritime domains and skies. 
Vietnam has also put significant efforts in training and retraining to transform its 
military into a modernized and professional one.
The third implication is funding. Military expenditure is directly linked with 
economic growth. The worsening economic conditions will have direct impact on 
the defense sector budget. Tighter funding also implies that Vietnam has to seriously 
consider the balance in developing different branches within its defense forces, with 
more attention being given to the navy and air force.
The fourth implication flows from the escalated situation in the South China Sea 
disputes. China’s strategy to increasingly deploy its paramilitary forces to patrol the 
South China Sea is both a move to consolidate its claims over the disputed areas, 
and a clever message to outsiders that China only uses “peaceful measures.” Contest 
for control of resources in the South China Sea increasingly becomes one among 
law enforcement vessels. Vietnam has to improve patrolling capability of its law 
enforcement forces, especially the Maritime Police, which is currently under the 
Ministry of Defense. Another question that is being considered is whether Vietnam 
should transfer Maritime Police from the Ministry of Defense to the command of 
other civilian agencies to avoid the accusations of using military forces for law 
enforcement purpose. Vietnam also has to improve interagency coordination among 
various forces under the defense sector (such as Maritime Police, Border Defense 
Command) and other civilian agencies (such as newly established Fishing Patrol 
Command under Ministry of Agriculture) to deal with non-traditional security 
threats and maritime issues.
The fifth implication is that defense diplomacy has to actively contribute to 
“maintaining a peaceful and stable environment,” and promoting regional 
cooperation. Vietnam’s policy in tackling the challenges in the South China Sea 
and the Mekong River is to bring up the issues of common concerns in international 
33 “Vietnam builds naval muscle,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NC29Ae01.html.
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and regional forums, and to engage China and other countries to collectively find 
solutions. The Vietnam defense sector also raises these issues in defense-related 
forums, and participates in confidence-building process within or outside the 
framework of DOC implementation.
The sixth implication relates to non-traditional security issues. Vietnam is one of 
the countries in the region most affected by natural disasters. As discussed above, 
Vietnam is already experiencing and is expected to suffer greatly under the “double 
impacts” of both upstream dam development in the Mekong River and global climate 
change. This development requires the defense sector to pay more attention and 
distribute adequate resources in contribution to disaster prevention and mitigation. 
The Ministry of Defense is permanently in charge of day-by-day work of the National 
Committee of Search and Rescue, which is responsible for search and rescue, and 
disaster relief. Vietnam’s defense sector also actively contributes to the work of the 
National Steering Committee for Flood and Storm Prevention and Control.
Vietnam’s Strengthened Defense Cooperation in Dealing with 
National Security Challenges
The complex nature of security threats has demanded Vietnam to “expand defense 
diplomacy and actively participate in defense and security cooperation in the 
regional and international community.”34 Bilaterally, Vietnam “wishes to widen 
defense relations with all countries,” and the range of prioritized activities includes 
“exchange of military delegations, information and sharing experience, cooperation 
in training and education, and solving humanitarian issues.”35 More significantly, 
Vietnam has diversified its defense relations beyond the former Soviet Union, 
Warsaw bloc, and traditional friends China, North Korea, Laos, Cuba, India, and 
Yugoslavia to 65 countries “spanning Asia-Pacific, Australasia, Europe, North 
America, the Middle East, South America and Africa,” observed Carlyle Thayer.36 
The following examples can testify to Vietnam’s strengthened defense cooperation 
with several partners:
34 Defence White Paper 2009, p. 24
35 Ibid.
36 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam People’s Army: Development and Modernization,” Research Monograph, April 
30, 2009, p.26. 
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•	 In 2007, the upgrade of Vietnam-India ties to strategic partnership paved the 
way for further exchanges of delegations, increases in frequency of goodwill 
visits by naval ships, application of information technology and e-technology, 
and technical support for the Vietnamese navy.
•	 In 2009, a Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed between Vietnam 
and Singapore to formalize existing interactions and promote new areas of 
cooperation such as study visits, military medicine, personnel education and 
training, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), as well as search 
and rescue (SAR).37
•	 Vietnam-China defense cooperation was taken to a higher level with the 
establishment of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in October 2008. 
Both sides agreed to step up cooperation in the research and transfer of military 
technologies, training of staff, organizing search and rescue missions, disarming 
[land] mines, and conducting joint sea patrols.
•	 In addition to China, Vietnam has set up hotlines and conducted joint patrols with 
Thailand, Cambodia, and Malaysia to “improve the effectiveness in coordination 
in maintaining security in overlapping zones and bordering areas at sea.”38
•	 Vietnam recently studied the possibility of military cooperation to mitigate the 
effects of natural disasters, and this topic has been raised in high level talks 
between Vietnam and Cuba. Cuba offered to assist Vietnam in building the civil 
defense force, training rescue, and natural disaster prevention work. 
•	 In September 2011, Vietnam and the US signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) on defense cooperation, which sought to promote cooperation in five 
priority fields: the establishment of regular, high-level dialogues between the 
U.S. Department of Defense and Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense, 
maritime security, search and rescue, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian 
37 “Singapore, Vietnam Sign Defence Cooperation Agreement,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, September 7, 
2009, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/sep/07sep09_nr.html (accessed January 
12, 2013).
38 Defence White Paper 2009, p.26
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assistance and disaster relief.39 
Vietnam also attaches great importance to multilateral cooperation in security issues 
through international/regional organizations and forums such as the UN, ASEAN, 
ARF, and APEC. During its term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) (2008-2009), Vietnam closely coordinated with other members of 
the UNSC in tackling international security challenges and successfully completed 
its mission. Vietnam is now preparing for its participation in the UN Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNPKO) in conformity with its capability and conditions. Activities 
under the auspices of ASEAN and ASEAN-related forums have been given strong 
support, and Hanoi displayed its activism when initiating the ADMM+8 (namely 
Australia, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the 
US). This mechanism was hoped to serve as an effective platform for consultation, 
building confidence, and finding areas of practical cooperation in the defense sector. 
Senior defense officials regularly attend the annual meeting of the Shangri-La 
Dialogue in Singapore, and Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh delivered 
important speeches at the 9th and 10th dialogues in 2010 and 2011 respectively.40
In the past few years, Vietnam has also earned kudos for its constructive maritime 
diplomacy. Recognizing the dangers of escalating territorial and maritime disputes, 
and its potential impacts on regional security and development, Vietnam’s foreign 
and defense ministries have repeatedly called for a peaceful resolution of disputes in 
accordance with international law and respect for freedom of navigation. This appeal 
has well resonated with the interests of other stakeholders in the region, and these 
issues have been addressed at various meetings such as EAS, ARF, ADMM+…, 
which eventually leads to a unanimity on the need to protect maritime security and 
preserve peace in the Asia-Pacific.
39 Lewis M. Stern, “Adding Strategic Depth to U.S.-Vietnamese Defense Relations,” Stratfor, May 17, 2012, 
http://www.stratfor.com/other-voices/adding-strategic-depth-us-vietnamese-defense-relations (accessed 
January 12, 2013).
40 His speech at the 9th dialogue titled “Renewing the Regional Security Architecture” can be accessed at 
http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/plenary-session-speeches/
sixth-plenary-session/phung-quang-thanh/ and the speech at 10thdialogue titled “Responding to New Maritime 
Security Threats” is available at http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2011/
speeches/fifth-plenary-session/general-phung-quang-thanh/.
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Prospects for Enhanced Regional Cooperation: Some Concluding 
Thoughts
Asia is standing at a critical transition where there exist numerous risks and 
uncertainties to its future. The US can no longer be the sole security provider for 
the region, while other rising powers have not displayed the will and capability to 
shoulder this burden. The security order must be redefined to reflect the new balance 
of power. Still, regional players have not been able to agree on a comprehensive 
structure that effectively addresses the web of traditional and non-traditional security 
threats confronting Asia. These threats are transnational in both nature and impact 
and therefore, they cannot be dealt with alone. To prevent a scenario of chaos and 
conflict, Asian countries need to join hands and create a principled order that can 
facilitate more substantive cooperation on security issues. With a forward-looking 
and constructive approach, Vietnam would strongly support and expect to see 
vigorous regional efforts in the following areas:
•	 Promoting cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). It 
is important to streamline existing HA/DR mechanisms in Asia so that resources 
are more effectively used and regional powers are encouraged to work together.
•	 Improving regional initiatives in search and rescue, assisting ships and fishermen 
in distress at sea. As the number of submarines in the region is increasing quickly, 
the idea of submarine search and rescue should be given timely attention. 
•	 Enhancing coordination in dealing with transnational crimes and piracy. Given 
the prominence of these threats in Asia, cooperation among law enforcement 
agencies should be prioritized and reinvigorated.
•	 Developing good practices, norms and rules to avoid incidents at sea. A model 
arrangement like the US-Soviet Incidents at Sea agreement should be studied 
thoroughly to become a multilateral agreement. 
•	 Working towards a Code of Conduct (COC) to foster confidence-building 
and create a favorable environment for cooperation. Such a COC can first be 
established in the South China Sea and then extended to other seas, should the 
relevant parties find applicable. 
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Globalization has essentially made collective security an essential element of national 
security and vice versa. Relevant stakeholders, both in and out of this region, should 
be able to realize this truth and collaborate to build a more predictable future of 
their own. The value of such a shared commitment toward peace and stability lies in 
what UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon once said: “We should not let our future 
generations suffer because of our failure to do the right thing.” 
